reminded us, scandalous. 2 The conventional establishment story of law foregrounds its autonomy and its untainted character. Law in this story is a matter of following established rules and precedents with little room for political maneuver. Increasingly challenged by scholars in the Critical Legal Studies movement as well as by those who have approached law from minority and feminist perspectives, this formalist, rule-oriented narrative has of late seen many rebuttals. The aim of many of these critiques has been to unearth the sociopolitical nature of law not only in the obviously partisan arena of congressional lawmaking but also in the supposedly impartial rulings of the courts. The emphasis on the ''cultural'' aspects of these issues, represented by many of the essays in this special issue, results from an awareness that the anthropological concept of ''culture''-despite its recent questioning by the anthropological community itself 3 -has emerged with an insistent regularity in the domain of law.
The nine contributors to this issue represent a wide range of current scholarly interest in the culture-law nexus. Feroza Jussawalla, Doriane Lambelet Coleman, and Alison Dundes Renteln address the most explicit entry of ''culture'' in the courthouse since they deal with aspects of what are ''cultural rights'' in the context of multicultural democracies. Jussawalla and Renteln plead on behalf of these rights while Coleman is more cautious of their use, particularly in criminal cases where ''culture'' is presented as a defense to violent crime. Ellen Messer-Davidow and Keith Werhan address First Amendment freedoms and their cultural bases. Messer-Davidow focuses on the role of the conservative movement in influencing college culture, and Werhan shows how cultural anxieties over the depiction of children have led the United States Supreme Court to ignore its own considered judgment in obscenity jurisprudence. Rosemary Coombe and Andrew Herman discuss intellectual property rights and trademark protections on the World Wide Web, showing not only how the threat of lawsuits can be brought to control the expression of netizens in digital environments but also how such threats can themselves encourage resistant cultural production. Carole Boyce Davies also explores such cultural resistance to the legal order and presents a reading of the deportation of black immigrants accused of Communism under the Smith Act and the Walter McCarren Act. And finally Robert Justin Lipkin and Ananyo Basu trace the nexus between culture and the law by looking, in Lipkin's case, into the moral personalities that are demanded by U.S. Constitutionalism, and in Basu's, the ethical and sociopolitical preconditions of the development of tort law in India.
As even this brief overview makes clear, while the contributors are all interested in the relationship between law and culture they do not speak in unison. ''Culture'' we must remember encapsulates a wide range of political dispositions and ideologies and thus the political tendencies of those who study it exhibit greater variation than do those of, say, a group of scholars in a movement such as Critical Legal Studies. This range, I hope the readers will find, makes a collection of essays like this one all the more compelling and perhaps all the more urgent.
The issue begins with Ellen Messer-Davidow's exemplary reading of the  Supreme Court case Rosenberger v. Rectors and Visitors of the University of Virginia. Messer-Davidow shows the ways in which two clauses of the same Constitutional provision can clash in a court of law. On one hand, the First Amendment guarantees that Congress shall make no law ''respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof '' and on the other, it disallows ''abridging the freedom of speech or of the press.'' This constitutional provision has been held to be applicable not only to the laws passed by Congress but more extensively to the activities of all state-funded institutions. What happens, then, when a student-run magazine that is clearly evangelical demands funding from a public university to run its operations? Is the university to fund the religiously based publication in an attempt to be nondiscriminatory toward the press and to fulfill a role in guaranteeing its freedom? Or is it, instead, to withhold funding in order to respect the clause that prohibits the state's ''establishment of religion''? Could withholding funding in this instance be construed instead as the state's interference with the free exercise of religion?
Messer-Davidow tracks this dilemma in the context of Rosenberger, a case that challenged the University of Virginia's decision to withhold funding from a student group called Wide Awake Publications. Since the group's publications were deemed to be evangelical, the university held that providing financial support to the group would clearly violate the ''establishment'' clause of the First Amendment. After several internal appeals as well as litigation in the lower courts, the case finally reached the Supreme Court, which ruled - that the university had improperly restricted the funds from the student group. The analysis offered by the majority as well as by the dissent, Messer-Davidow argues, was flawed in that it failed to adequately distinguish between religious acts and religious speech. So, for instance, while the dissent clearly saw the wisdom of the university's withholding funding, in reading the magazine transparently as a religious organization, Messer-Davidow claims, the judges failed to use the opportunity to hone in on the distinction between religious speech and religious action. What was called for, she suggests, was a more exacting analysis that would clearly differentiate between a discussion of religious topics and an evangelical call to a particular faith.
The case for the plaintiff was made in alliance with a conservative legal foundation in Washington, D.C., the Center for Individual Rights, and much of the aim of Messer-Davidow's essay is to expose the role of such foundations in contemporary lawmaking. The plaintiff 's argument, which the majority was persuaded by, was that Wide Awake Publications was not a religious organization but a student media group that had suffered undue viewpoint discrimination at the hands of the university. Indeed, the majority noted that since other publications funded by the university did include the topic of religion for discussion, the mere fact that a Christian viewpoint was being expressed-albeit evangelically-was not sufficient for the university to disallow the funding. Messer-Davidow presents a detailed critique of the Court's reasoning and particularly of its attempt to differentiate the Student Activities Fund from public taxpayer money.
This distinction on the part of the majority, suggests Messer-Davidow, showed a misunderstanding of the nature of university accounting and funding; it also opened the door for a series of litigations that drew upon individual student intent in the use and disbursement of funds. Providing for individual intent allowed conservative students to protest the use of ''their'' money to support, say, a feminist student organization. Outlining the growth of such ''student-fees'' lawsuits in the nineties and their close ties to conservative think-tanks and legal organizations, Messer-Davidow makes a clear link between issues of constitutional jurisprudence and the cultural and political movements in the society at large. While the recent ruling by the Supreme Court in Southworth v. Grebe, a student-fees case from Wisconsin, suggests that the Court seeks to curb the reach of individual student intent, Rosenberger's effect of unleashing a campus conservative movement in the nineties may already have had a stronger hold on the nation's political unconscious than any other legal decision may now curtail.
One of the hinges in Messer-Davidow's critique of Rosenberger is the Court's inability to draw a line between religion as a topic for discussion and evangelical acts. As the history of First Amendment jurisprudence concerned with obscenity cases suggests, such distinctions between protected speech and unprotected acts are difficult to orchestrate. In an essay that attempts to unearth the limits of free speech legislation, Keith Werhan outlines the landmark cases in the development of obscenity laws. Thus, for instance, in the oft-cited case Roth v. United States, the Supreme Court specifically excluded obscenity from free speech protection since it was deemed to be ''utterly without redeeming social importance'' and appealed not to the intellectual, moral, or aesthetic qualities but rather to the ''prurient interests'' of its consumers. The Court deemed, however, that sexual expression that did not cater to such prurient interest was protected and that sex and obscenity were not synonymous. The Court ruled that ''community standards'' would be used to decide whether the particular content in question was ''obscene'' but also ensured in the development of subsequent obscenity jurisprudence that such community standards would not violate protected forms of speech. In reviewing a case from Georgia, for instance, in which a jury had deemed the mainstream film Carnal Knowledge to be obscene, the Court overturned the verdict claiming that nudity alone without the depiction of hard core sexual conduct was not excluded from the protection of the First Amendment.
If the Court has thus historically sought a balanced approach in its handling of sexually explicit materials, when it comes to the depiction of children, Werhan notes, the Court has made no attempt to draw upon its own considered judgment on the distinction between protected speech and unprotected acts. In New York v. Ferber, a case in which the defendant, Paul Ferber, was accused of obscenity and child pornography, the jury acquitted Ferber on the count of obscenity but convicted him on the charges of engaging in child pornography. The Supreme Court upheld this conviction, which, on its face, suggests that obscene conduct-conduct appealing to prurient interests-is not a necessary condition for a conviction of engaging in child pornography. The thematic protections around sexual depictions and discourse that the Court had earlier held in cases that did not involve children were not extended to this particular arena. Focusing on the harm suffered by child subjects who are the objects of such depictions, the Court stated that these harms are of greater magnitude than any possible benefits that may arise from such depictions. Werhan suggests that these measures taken by the Court to protect minors might make sense except that by completely disallowing any investigation of the appeal or lack of appeal to the ''prurient interests'' of the consumers and, furthermore, by allowing child-pornography laws to include not only children engaged in sexually explicit acts but also depictions of nude children, the Court has in effect put in a vulnerable position culturally acclaimed texts such as the newly made film rendition of Nabokov's Lolita. Again, while the intention of protecting children from harm is one that we may share, Werhan suggests that the particular attempt by Congress to pass the Child Pornography Prevention Act in  was misguided insofar as it would have outlawed not only the actual depiction of minors but also images of overage models who portray minors. Such depictions by overage models, writes Werhan, complicate the balance between the principle of harm to child subjects on one hand and freedom of speech on the other.
The reluctance of the Supreme Court to treat child pornography with the same nuance as pornography in general is a subject that probably merits a longer and more sustained treatment than Werhan can here provide. But what is clear is that the depiction of children raises an anxiety that is set deep in the cultural milieu of contemporary U.S. society. If the stricter controls on the depiction of children suggest a hypersensitivity to their special vulnerability, such controls must necessarily be based on societal recognition that American childhood itself is subject to perilous eroticization. If, as we suggest, culture and law continue to mutually direct each other, it remains to be seen which one will take the lead in the further development of this arena of jurisprudence.
Restrictions on speech may come from the corporate sector as well as from the federal government. May a former Playmate of the Year, for instance, so describe herself on a Web site that she has created to advertise her services as a model? May a group of senior citizens set up a Web site to display their private collections of vintage Coca-Cola bottles and cans? May fans of rock stars set up fansites with images and stories of their favorite media icons? May an enterprising Internet service provider register a site called ''Adults R Us''? These are among the many questions that Rosemary Coombe and Andrew Herman address in their lively piece on digital public and corporate culture. Coombe and Herman are concerned about the fate of intellectual property laws and particularly the corporate control of trademarks on the World Wide Web. Because of their wide and rapid reach, digital environments, Coombe and Herman suggest, have received intense scrutiny on the part of corporations who have gone to extreme measures to ensure that their corporate ''goodwill'' is untainted in the public imaginary.
In doing so, however, they have risked alienating not only those who were critical of their activities in the first place but also those who were otherwise their most loyal consumers. The cease-and-desist letters increasingly being sent by corporations have caused resentment and resistance among Web commentators who have, in turn, created ''rogue'' sites that present parodies of target companies and generate comprehensive critiques of the corporations in question. Coombe and Herman trace the rapid development of a digital counterculture whose vigilance and watchdog tactics have brought increasing awareness of the reach and power of corporate control of intellectual property. The struggle between individual netizens and corporate entities, now being handled more and more through arbitration, demonstrates that the nexus between legal sanction and cultural expression is already at work long before such matters ever enter a court of law.
To those of us who may take the right to free speech for granted, Carole Boyce Davies offers a sobering reminder from a not too distant history. Claudia Jones, a black Trinidadian immigrant in the United States arrested for allegedly advocating revolution and the overthrow of the U.S. government, becomes for Davies an exemplary case of the resilient black activist before the law. Davies's essay attempts to present a close reading of the intellectual biography of this diasporic subject and in so doing clearly foregrounds the human face of the victims of immigration law. Jones was deemed deportable under the Smith Act (the Alien Registration Act of ) and the Walter McCarren Act for no reason other than holding unpopular political beliefs, and Davies suggests that her predicament was continuous with the larger denial of rights to black subjects in American history. Meditating on the relationship among citizenship, deportation, and exile, Davies portrays a scenario that hearkens back to the denial of citizenship during slavery and looks forward to the continued disproportional incarceration of African Americans in contemporary times. Readers of this essay will find that Davies is less interested in the formal aspects of legislation than in the ways in which laws enter the everyday lives of human subjects and the ways in which these subjects negotiate their predicament. So, for instance, while she is critical of the anti-Communist laws that dictated the fate of many black intellectuals, forcing them into voluntary or involuntary exile, she is more interested in the ways in which these subjects forged new identities to carry on the activist work in which they were engaged. The reading of Claudia Jones that Davies presents here draws on her literary writings (including poems) to demonstrate the emergence of a new internationalist identity. While we must remain critical of the wide, and in this case unjust, reach of the law, we must nevertheless, Davies suggests, keep hope and not be easily defeated.
The next three essays also take immigration as their point of departure. While in the past the rights of immigrant minorities were easily swept under the ideology of assimilation, minority groups now, strengthened by their numbers as well as by their slow but sure access to the public forum, are demanding that their traditions and values be granted protection by the law. In such a scenario of clashing values and clashing traditions, lawmakers and scholars have of late been increasingly interested in forging new democratic cultures that allow for cultural diversity, but at the same time ensure that some of the basic values of the Western liberal tradition are left unviolated. This, as one can imagine, is not an easy project since much of the debate over cultural belief and value is directed at questioning the fundamental premises of Western liberalism itself. The essays by Feroza Jussawalla, Doriane Lambelet Coleman, and Alison Dundes Renteln attempt to articulate visions of a new legal order that comes to terms with the demands of multicultural citizenship.
Echoing the title of Susan Moller Okin's much-debated essay, ''Is Multiculturalism Bad for Women?'' 4 Feroza Jussawalla asks whether cultural rights are bad for multicultural societies. In a piece that is frankly polemical, Jussawalla admonishes postcolonial intellectuals for what she sees as their betrayal of the cultural groups from which they emerge. Recalling the events surrounding the Rushdie Affair-the protests of British Muslims against the publication of Rushdie's Satanic Verses-Jussawalla charges that many minority intellectuals who had previously been critical of aspects of cultural racism in Anglo-American society nevertheless participated in the dominant culture's stereotyping of the protesters as barbaric and fundamentalist illiberals. She suggests that such intellectual critiques could have been more sensitive and circumspect, using their theoretical rigor to analyze the pain caused by the book, to empathize with the plight of a minority culture that desperately sought redress through the laws of blasphemy, a culture that experienced the sacrilegious text as an act of religious violence and not solely as art or free speech. Given the history that she herself outlines it is clear that not everyone will agree with Jussawalla's final position. Nevertheless one hopes that few would reject her plea to remain vigilant to the limits of liberal tolerance.
This limit is precisely what is at issue in Doriane Lambelet Coleman's article. Coming from exactly the opposite direction as Jussawalla, Coleman argues that immigrant groups should not expect the dominant morality of Western societies to be swayed by traditions and values that are at odds with it. Criminal law in particular, she insists, must pay attention to the harm principle and disallow those practices that the majority deems harmful regardless of their origin in the traditions of immigrant cultures. Coleman's call to ''an admittedly ethnocentric vision of human and women's rights'' is based on her study of what have come to be called ''cultural defense'' cases in U.S. criminal law. Coleman presents an analysis of one such case, People v. Chen, in which a Chinese immigrant, Dong Lu Chen, faced murder charges for killing his wife who he had suspected of having an extra-marital affair. In the defense, Chen's lawyers argued that he had acted as any similarly situated Chinese man would and that his actions, based as they were on his cultural background, deserved a lesser penalty. In perhaps the most direct introduction of culture to the law that we find discussed in this issue, Coleman tells us that the defense even brought an anthropologist into the courtroom to build its case on cultural grounds. Moved by the argument of the defense and the testimony of the anthropologist, the judge allowed for the use of culture as a mitigating factor and reduced Chen's conviction from first-degree to second-degree murder.
Coleman argues that the judge's acceptance of the cultural defense reflects ''an old racist perspective-about the propensities of 'others' to violence and about the relative insignificance of their victims-that has formally been rejected in the law.'' Furthermore she argues that the defense is incoherent in its handling of the important issue of mens rea (criminal intent) and that such a defense is inherently discriminatory insofar as it singles out immigrants for special treatment in courts of criminal law. The cultural defense in criminal cases, Coleman suggests, runs counter to the deeply held values on which American jurisprudence is based. But to say this, she suggests, is not necessarily to be anti-immigrant. Rather, it is to give strong support to those immigrants ''who would seek the protection of the laws and cultural inclinations of the United States.'' Further, she maintains that being against the use of cultural defense in criminal cases need say nothing about one's position on social programs-such as affirmative action in education and employment-that have been put in place to create better opportunities for historically disempowered minorities. Being opposed to the use of the cultural defense in criminal cases need not mean being also opposed to other aspects of cultural rights in society at large.
Alison Dundes Renteln reminds us that such rights should extend also to the dead. In an essay that foregrounds the significance of the rites of death in different religious communities, Renteln claims that the surviving relatives of the dead-if not the dead themselves-have a right to have their religious beliefs upheld in matters concerning the dead. The two types of cases that she considers are state-sanctioned autopsies by medical examiners and cases that involve a tort claim against funeral directors who mismanage the handling of corpses. In the former, in some jurisdictions, medical coroners often automatically perform an autopsy in conjunction with a criminal case. Such autopsies offend the religious beliefs of certain groups, including the Hmong, Jews, Mexican Americans, Muslims, and the Navaho. Renteln traces the attempts of members of these groups to bring court injunctions against such autopsies and to file cases against coroners for performing autopsies when there was no compelling state interest in performing them. Renteln suggests that autopsies should be performed only when absolutely necessary and only when a compelling state interestsuch as the gathering of information related to a widespread epidemic-is involved. In the second group of cases, those that involve the mismanagement of corpses, Renteln suggests that greater cultural literacy is needed on the part of funeral directors who serve multicultural constituents. The fact that courts have begun to allow damages for emotional distress to the relatives of the dead in such cases suggests to Renteln that the law recognizes the importance of cultural sensitivity as an integral aspect of the professionalization of funeral directors. She ends with the hope that the courts will use the same cultural sensitivity in regulating and deciding autopsy cases in the years to come.
The final two articles in this collection address the nexus between law and culture in the most expansive and interdisciplinary terms. Does American constitutional democracy as we have come to know it encourage or indeed demand a particular kind of moral personality? Is the relatively underdeveloped state of tort law in postcolonial India the legacy of long-standing, religiously based, sociocultural traditions? In asking the first question Robert Justin Lipkin draws upon a rich tradition of political thought that has attempted to understand the nature of deliberative justice and its role in the sustenance of a democratic society. Likewise, in looking into the history of tort legislation in India and showing its multiple legacies, Ananyo Basu draws upon his expertise both as a professor of philosophy and as a trained legal scholar to answer the second.
Lipkin's article attempts to draw a distinction between two types of moral personality-deliberative and dedicativist. A deliberative personality is essentially open, democratic in orientation, and willing to question its own unthoughts. Dedicativist personalities are foundationalist insofar as they depend on dogmatic orthodoxies that are not open to scrutiny. Lipkin argues that deliberativism is the preferred mode of the American communitarian republic and his article presents a detailed account of why deliberation is better than dedicativist morality. Along the way he cautions us not to confuse dedicativist positions necessarily with religious positions since, he explains, religious positions can often be based on deliberative thinking and, likewise, some secular positions may exhibit dedicativist qualities. Most readers, I imagine, will not object to the distinction between the forms of personality as Lipkin presents them nor will they find anything amiss in the suggestion that being deliberative is better than being dedicativist. But as Lipkin himself notes, those who might expect to find here a recipe for resolving real societal differences through deliberative means may not always have these resolutions delivered. Instead, they may have to be satisfied with an illumination of ''what underlies our deep disagreement in political and cultural controversy'' and hope for a reasoned consensus. Such a consensus, Lipkin points out, need not be based on a position of ''anything goes'' but on a historical understanding of the particularities of American constitutionalism.
Ananyo Basu's article is unique in this collection insofar as it is the only one that is focused on the cultural aspects of law in a non-Western context. Basu notes that the fact that tort law in India has historically been relatively underdeveloped became painfully clear during the litigation associated with the Union Carbide disaster in Bhopal. Basu presents an account of the litigation that moved from U.S. courts to Indian courts for reasons of jurisdiction and notes that despite the relative underdevelopment of Indian tort law, the judges handled the case admirably. For instance, he suggests that their activist orientation resulted in the establishment of a new form of liability-''absolute enterprise liability'' that could be invoked in the Union Carbide case. But despite their noble efforts to provide redress Basu writes that the settlement was comparatively weak, with victims being inadequately compensated for their suffering.
Provoked by his reading of this particular case, Basu proceeds in the article to investigate the historical reasons behind this particular deficiency in Indian law. For in every other aspect, Basu notes, Indian law has performed rather well. Looking into the religious and cultural sources of Indian law in Hindu tradition, Basu suggests that Hindu law was based on an overwhelmingly deontological (duty-based) ethics. This meant that the focus of the law was often more on punishment and repentance than on redress to the wronged. Criminal taxonomies and punishments are highly developed in such a legal system but there is little attention to the compensation of victims. Added to this, the doctrine of karma, Basu suggests, may even have discouraged victims from seeing themselves as such. The nonconsequentialist ethics of Hinduism may be seen to have indelibly marked the development of Indian law. Yet, Basu argues, cultural and religious explanations cannot by themselves account for the underdevelopment of tort law in India. While much of postcolonial Indian law draws upon British common law, the British colonials themselves had a vested interest in not developing torts in the context of a colonial economy. Colonial interests and their postcolonial avatars, too, need to be factored in, writes Basu, to the point at which ''the economist may have more to tell us . . . than the anthropologist.'' Put together, then, the essays in this issue, each in a unique way, provide a provocative reading of culture before the law. Culture they suggest is before, or prior to, the law insofar as the institution of law emerges only within specific cultural contexts. But culture is also before the law-that is, in front of the law insofar as the law can and indeed does effect control over the cultural terrain. 5 Taken to their logical limit, these articles, one may well argue, suggest that a renewed attention to the nexus between culture and law must recognize, with Bourdieu, that our own categories of experiencing culture are often derived from the law even as we now begin to pay attention to the cultural foundations of law itself. 
